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Dueling Arguments: The Moral Argument and The Argument from Evil
The Moral Argument
(1) Theism implies there are no unjustified evils.
(2) There are some objective moral truths.
(3) Objective moral truths imply theism.
Therefore,
(4) Theism is true, and there are no unjustified evils, so the argument from evil is unsound.
The Argument from Evil
(1) Theism implies there are no unjustified evils.
(2) There are some objective moral truths.
(3) There are some unjustified evils.
Therefore,
(4) Theism is false, and objective moral truths do not imply theism, so the moral argument is unsound.
Notice both arguments share Premise (1) as common ground. Premise (2) can be common ground in the sense the atheist can concede this premise to the theist, but the atheist is under no obligation to concede this premise. For example, an atheist who is also a moral subjectivist or a moral nihilist could instead argue,
(1) Theism implies there are no unjustified evils as judged from some set of moral attitudes and responses.
(2) There are no objective moral truths.
(3) There are some unjustified evils as judged from some set of moral attitudes and responses.
Therefore,
(4) Theism is false, and there are no objective moral truths, so the moral argument is unsound.
Any theist defending the moral argument is not in a similar situation. They must make the case there are some objective moral truths. That is essential to their case in a way it is not essential to the atheist’s case for the argument from evil. For the sake of argument, we will concede the second premise of both arguments and instead focus our attention on their third premises. The strength of the case for the moral argument will depend on the strength of the case for the claim objective moral truths imply theism. Similarly, the strength of the case for the argument from evil will depend on the strength of the case for the claim there are some unjustified evils.
I want to argue that premise (3) of the argument from evil is more plausible. Why believe this? Secular forms of moral objectivism such as ethical non-naturalism and ethical naturalism are more plausible than theodicies. In fact, skeptical theism admits theodicies are inadequate for avoiding the conclusion there are some unjustified evils. That move effectively concedes the apparent unjustified nature of some evils while insisting we cannot know whether they are really unjustified or not. Atheists do not have to make any such retreats into moral skepticism. The atheist is in a good position to insist there are some unjustified evils, we can know this, and there is no good reason to believe objective moral truths imply theism. However, the theist is not in a similarly good position to insist we cannot know there are any unjustified evils despite appearances nor that objective moral truths imply theism.
It is important to notice that all of the above reasoning does not consider modified divine command theory. No reasoning here depends on any successful objection to that view. This reasoning helps us see several things lacking in the theist’s case prior to even assessing such a view. First, it helps us see how little support theists have actually given us for premise (2). Second, it helps us see how weak the theist’s case is to avoid the crucial premise of the argument from evil. Third, it helps us see that the moral argument has at least two secular, meta-ethical views that it must undermine if it is to be plausible at all. The plausibility that some things matter for their own sake in favor of the atheist’s case combined with the implausibility of theism’s inability to explain the appearance of unjustified evils helps us understand the uphill battle the moral argument is fighting against the argument from evil. These arguments are not on par. The moral argument makes at least two crucial claims which are not difficult for the atheist to avoid. However, the argument from evil only makes a single crucial claim which is quite difficult for the theist to avoid.
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